If agents learn-by-doing and are myopic, less advanced ¿rms might adopt new technologies while more advanced ¿rms stick with the old technology. This kind of overtaking can also occur if agents are forward looking and have high discount rates. However, overtaking never occurs if agents are suf¿ciently patient. A ¿nite discount rate increases the set of states at which agents adopt new technologies, so more patient agents tend to upgrade their technology more frequently. AE We thank Boyan Jovanovic and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Remaining errors are ours.
Modern development economics emphasizes the role of technology in determining growth paths. Lucas (1993) identi¿es technology adoption as the most important explanation of the economic growth of several Asian countries. Recent textbooks such as Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) reÀect the importance attributed to technology in explaining growth. Technological improvements can lead to divergence in growth paths when ¿rms in the "advanced" country have a greater incentive to adopt new technology. In other circumstances, ¿rms in less advanced countries may be more likely adopt the new technology, even when it is less pro¿table for them than for the advanced ¿rms. The adoption decision depends on a comparison of pro¿ts under the new technology and under the next best alternative, i.e. on the opportunity cost of adoption. The opportunity cost of adoption may be higher for the more advanced ¿rms, because of their pro¿ciency in using the old technology. In this case, innovations in technology can contribute to the convergence of growth paths, or even to "overtaking" (or "leapfrogging") by the less advanced country.
There have been a number of historical examples where technology adoption has contributed to overtaking, both at the industry and country level. Industries in regions destroyed by war (such as in post-war Europe and Japan) sometimes rebuild using the latest technology, eventually overtaking established industries elsewhere. Start-up industries may begin with the latest technology which incumbents are slow to adopt. Brezis et al. (1993) cite cases where new technologies have contributed to overtaking by entire countries rather than individual sectors.
The incentives to adopt a new technology depend on the ¿rm's ability to use the previous generation of technology. This ability may depend on the experience the ¿rm has had with the technology, i.e., on the amount of learning-by-doing that has occurred. Chari and Hopenhayn (1991) , Parente (1994) and Stokey (1988) study learning-bydoing as a force for sustained growth. Brezis et al. (1993) , Krussell and Rios-Rull (1996) , and Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) (hereafter JN) show that learning-by-doing can give rise to the type of overtaking noted in the growth literature. An agent accustomed to an existing technology may be unwilling to adopt a newer technology which requires learning and leads to lower pro¿ts in the short run. An agent who is less familiar with the existing technology has a lower opportunity cost of adopting the new technology. The second agent may adopt the new technology and eventually overtake the ¿rst, who was initially more advanced. 1 If learning is a non-excludable public good (as in Brezis et al. (1993) ) or if it is a private good but ¿rms are myopic (as in JN), the adoption decision depends on a comparison of current pro¿ts under the old and new technology. However, forwardlooking ¿rms who internalize learning-by-doing would consider the future stream of payoffs in deciding whether to adopt the new technology. We show that overtaking may still occur, but it is less likely when ¿rms are forward looking. Overtaking is less likely in markets with high discount factors.
Jovanovic and Nyarko's 1994 working paper had also studied the problem when the ¿rm is patient. That working paper establishes that overtaking can occur with a positive but suf¿ciently small discount factor (our Theorems 1 and 2). In addition to addressing the problem in a formal way, our Proposition 3 and Theorem 3 highlight the important balancing acts behind the technology adoption decision. Our results show that a larger discount factor increases the set of parameter values at which upgrading occurs the more patient the ¿rms are, the greater the bene¿t of the new technology, which takes time to learn.
Model
We modify JN's model of learning-by-doing by including forward looking ¿rms. The payoff in period | depends on a random parameter + | . As the ¿rm learns about the distribution of this parameter, its payoff increases. A ¿rm working with a technology 1 There is an industrial organization literature on leapfrogging which is closely related to the economic growth literature we cite in the text. The IO literature emphasizes ¿rms' strategic incentives to change a decision, such as improving technology. Budd et al. (1993) review recent contributions to leapfrogging models in IO, and Brezis et al. (1993) discuss the relation between the two literatures. of grade ? chooses % in period | and receives the payoff:
After observing the payoff, the ¿rm can infer the value of + | since it knows c ?c %.
This inferred value is + | ' w c n | , the sum of two random variables w c is a random variable that depends on the technology grade ? | , and | is an i.i.d. Normal random variable with zero mean and variance j 2 % . The ¿rm knows the distribution of | . It does not know the value of w c but has prior beliefs about it.
Before learning + | the ¿rm maximizes the expected payoff by setting % equal to the expected value of + | , conditional on information available in period |:
where the second equality follows from the fact that | is white noise. This choice yields the expected payoff:
where var | Ew c is the variance of w c conditional on information available in period | Technology grades are integer-valued and the ¿rm can move up by at most one grade in a single period. There is no pecuniary cost of switching, but skills acquired in working with the old technology are only partially transferable, so there are learning costs. Different grades of technology are linked to each other according to the following relationshipG
where " cn q Efc j 2 4 and w c and " cn are independent. The ¿rm updates its prior on w c based on the signal + | Denote the precision of the unknown technological parameter w c in period | by # | and the precision of | by
. We assume that D : , which implies that ¿rms earn positive pro¿ts for suf¿ciently large #. In period the ¿rm begins with a Normal prior on the current technology (the value of w) with precision # .
We now describe how # changes over time. First suppose that the ¿rm does not upgrade technology in period | Using the assumptions that | is a Normal random variable, and that the prior on w c is Normal, the precision in period | n is (see DeGroot, 1970) :
If the ¿rm upgrades, the variance is updated through two steps. The ¿rst step is due to the technology switch and the second is due to the observation of the outcome from the new technology. The ¿rst step transforms the variance (prior to the switch) var | Ew c to k var | Ew c n j 2 4 (the variance after the switch) due to the transformation of w c as in equation (2) . The ¿rm then chooses %, observes^|, infers + | , and updates its beliefs about the value of w cn . The second step transforms the post-switch variance using equation (3) . Combining the two, the precision in the period after a switch occurs is
The function E# represents the ¿rst step of the updating procedure. Hereafter we restrict attention to state space where # E#. The sequence problem which maximizes the discounted expected payoff, given the 2 This restriction is innocuous, since for any initial condition it must be satis¿ed in ¿nite time, regardless of the agent's upgrade decisions. If the restriction is satis¿ed at any period, it holds in all subsequent periods. Moreover, given the interpretation of the function k+,, the model is sensible only when the restriction is satis¿ed. (If ? k+,> upgrading increases precision, which means that the agent knows more about the new technology than about the old technology.) initial precision # and technology grade ? ' f is: 
where
An optimal policy, & W E#c ?c solves the DPE (5).
Preliminaries
Since we use the DPE in later analysis, we begin by showing that its solution exists and that it solves the problem E7 under the following Assumption 1 q
Proposition 1 1. There exists a solution to the DPE (5).
2. Under Assumption 1, the solution to the DPE satisfying
is the unique solution to the sequence problem (SP).
Next we show that the optimal upgrade rule depends on the value of #, but not on the grade of technology ? or on time, |.
Proposition 2 The optimal upgrade rule depends only on
The proofs of these and subsequent results are in the Appendix.
Choice of Technology

Myopic Case
We ¿rst review JN's results for the case where ¿rms base their current adoption decisions only on pro¿ts in the current period. Here, ¿rms solve the problem 4@ i> 5 c E> ÅE5 j, which uses the de¿nition of E#. The ¿rst term in the maximand equals pro¿ts if the ¿rm sticks with the current technology, and the second equals pro¿ts if the ¿rm upgrades to the next generation of technology. The factor c affects pro¿ts under both alternatives, but not the adoption decision.
The ¿rm sticks with the current technology if and only if the current precision satis¿es the inequality
The function 5E# gives the increased pro¿ts, in the current period, resulting from not upgrading. In other words, 5E# is the cost of adoption. The slope of 5E# has the same sign as k. If there exists a positive root of 5E# ' f, it is unique. Denote this root (when it exists) as # 3k j 2 " 3bE3 . The ¿rm is indifferent between upgrading and sticking if and only if # ' # , i.e. when the opportunity cost of adoption is zero. Table 1 summarizes the relation between the parameter values and the optimal decision. In entries along the diagonal, it is optimal either never to upgrade or to upgrade in every period, regardless of the value of #. In these situations, # does not exist. In the lower left entry of Table 1 , ¿rms with low precision stick with the current technology until they learn to use it suf¿ciently well (until # # ), at which time they upgrade. We refer to this as the "standard" case.
In the upper right entry, it is optimal to upgrade only if the ¿rm has low precision.
A ¿rm that is relatively unfamiliar with the current technology (i.e., has low precision # # ) upgrades, whereas the ¿rm that knows how to use the current technology well (i.e. has high precision # : # ) sticks with it. In this situation, the ¿rm with lower initial precision (and thus, lower initial pro¿ts) may eventually obtain higher pro¿ts:
it continues to upgrade its technology even though it never becomes expert at using it.
In that sense, it overtakes the ¿rm with high initial precision.
In order to guarantee that overtaking occurs, we need the following additional restriction. De¿ne # r as the (unique) positive steady state to equation (4).
Assumption 2 # : # r
The following lemma summarizes the overtaking result in JN. 
General Case
This section generalizes the results from the myopic setting. All of the four possibilities described in Table 1 remain when q is positive. Thus, the possibility that overtaking occurs does not rely on the assumption that ¿rms are myopic. However, if ¿rms are suf¿ciently patient, overtaking cannot occur. We also show that a positive value of q never decreases, and typically increases the set of precision levels at which upgrading is optimal. In this sense, a forward looking ¿rm upgrades more frequently than a myopic ¿rm.
Overtaking requires that there is an interval of # over which the ¿rm is willing to upgrade. Moreover, if the initial precision lies in this interval, the equilibrium technology sequence is unbounded:
There is also a critical value of #, which we denote #, above which the ¿rm never upgrades. Thus, if one ¿rm begins with precision in the interval for which upgrading continues, and a second ¿rm begins with # : #, the ¿rst ¿rm eventually uses a higher grade technology and receives higher pro¿ts in every period, regardless of the initial technologies (the initial values of ?).
The next two theorems analyze the ¿rst row of Table 1 We next show how forward-looking behavior changes the set of # at which upgrading is optimal. We de¿ne # q as a value of # at which the ¿rm with discount factor q is indifferent between sticking with the current technology and upgrading. That is, # q satis¿es
(so # f ' # ). As with the static case, # q may not exist, in which case the ¿rm either upgrades in every period, or never upgrades. Unlike the static case, we have not shown that # q is unique. When we refer to # q we always mean any value of # that satis¿es equation (6) .
We show that 5E# q : f for q : f. This inequality means that at a level of precision where the ¿rm is indifferent between upgrading and sticking, upgrading reduces pro¿ts in the current period. We have De¿ne the "upgrade set" { q ' i# G &E# ' j, the set of # for which it is optimal to upgrade, given q. (the second row in Table 1 ) so that overtaking does not occur when q ' f, then overtaking cannot occur when q : f. Finally, if j Table 1 ) myopic ¿rms would never upgrade. For these parameter values and q : fc ¿rms might upgrade when # is suf¿ciently large. In this case, the introduction of a positive discount factor transforms the "stagnation" scenario to the "standard" scenario, in which ¿rms wait until they are suf¿ciently familiar with the current technology before upgrading.
Theorem 3 compares the upgrade sets for a myopic and a forward looking ¿rm.
Under the hypothesis that the value function is differentiable in q, we can show that for small values of q the upgrade set is monotone in q: { q { q for q : q In this case, as the ¿rm becomes more patient, the set of precision levels at which it upgrades increases. Unfortunately, this is a local result (at q ' f) and it assumes differentiability of the value function.
In order to check the robustness of this local result, we solved the dynamic programming problem numerically using the method of value function iteration. 5 In these simulations we treat the state variable as @oEw 5 f. The restriction # E# implies that @oEw ), where ) solves A ' E A . Thus, the state space is the interval dfc )o. For all of our simulations, we ¿nd that # q is unique, which implies that the upgrade set is connected if the ¿rm upgrades at two levels of @oEw, it upgrades at any convex combination of those values. Also, the upgrade set is monotonic in q: more patient ¿rms are more likely to adopt new technologies. Figure 1 graphs the critical value of @oEw (which equals the inverse of # q ) as 5 We put a grid on the state space and used linear interpolation to calculate the value function at points off the grid. We iterated on the value function until the largest change in the value function (over all points on the grid, from one iteration to the next) was no greater than 43 Ã43 . In most cases we achieved this tolerance in fewer than 75 iterations, although for values of that approached 4 we needed nearly 400 iterations. The model assumes that there is no spillover of information across ¿rms. There are a number of ways that we can think of informational spillovers. If all ¿rms had exactly the same information, they would make the same decisions and there could be no possibility of overtaking. A more realistic view is that one ¿rm's learning is more informative to ¿rms with similar technologies, and that a ¿rm learns only from ¿rms with a more advanced technology i.e. spillovers are asymmetric. (For example, the additional information acquired by someone who does wordprocessing is more useful to someone who currently uses a typewriter than it is to someone who uses only pen and paper, and the additional learning by the person who uses pen and paper does not help the other two agents.) Equation E2 is consistent with this assumption. A lower value of k implies that the information content of a signal decays rapidly as the distance between generations of technology increases. (See footnote 7 of JN.) JN show that overtaking can occur with this model of spillovers when q ' f. This possibility also arises for small q, as a modi¿cation of their argument shows. When k is suf¿ciently small, spillovers are not very important, and their presence cannot eliminate overtaking. JN also point out that in order for spillovers to change a ¿rm's decision not to upgrade, the spillovers must have an effect "early on", while the leader is still using a technology similar to the laggard's. This qualitative result should also hold in the case where q : f.
In other respects, a positive value of q may change the effect of spillovers among a group of ¿rms that behave nonstrategically. Suppose that ¿rms are small, and that each ¿rm takes the investment trajectory of other ¿rms as given. Each ¿rm recognizes that by failing to keep up with ¿rms that are using more advanced technologies, it lowers its ability to learn from them in the future. This recognition increases the value of upgrading in the current period rather than in the future. A larger value of q increases the importance of this effect, and thus tends to increase the role of spillovers in promoting innovation.
However, in an equilibrium where overtaking occurs, a ¿rm recognizes that by delaying innovation it increases the number of ¿rms who will be using the same or a higher level of technology in the future. This delay increases the ¿rm's ability to learn in the future and provides an incentive to postpone adoption. A larger value of q magni¿es this incentive.
Thus, for a speci¿c ¿rm, it is unclear whether spillovers increase or decrease the incentive to upgrade when q : f. Consequently, the equilibrium effect of spillovers is uncertain. Note that the incentive to delay vanishes when q ' f or if there is no overtaking in equilibrium. In either of those cases, spillovers have only the positive effect on innovation at both the individual and the aggregate levels.
Generalized Technology Choice
The ¿rm's choice set is rather restricted, since it must either upgrade to the next level 
where " 8 q Efc 4 8 j 2 4 and
and w c and " 8 are independent. The variance after a k-stage upgrade is
The single period pro¿t of a k-stage upgrade is
For comparison we consider the myopic ¿rm ¿rst.
Proposition 4
Suppose the ¿rm is myopic. Table 1 , so the over-taking result is not overturned by the generalized technology choice. The parameter restrictions in the lower right corner of Table 1 imply that the conditions in Part 1(b) are met therefore, when continual upgrading is optimal under the restricted technology, the ¿rm always prefers an immediate in¿nite upgrade. The condition under Part 2 of the proposition is consistent with 6 Hereafter we ignore the special case @ 4 since it has the same characterization as the case A 4.
(a) If
the left column of Table 1 We conclude that the conditions that insure that the ¿rm is on the boundary & ' in the restricted model are not suf¿cient to insure that the ¿rm would be at the upper boundary when it has a larger (possibly in¿nite) choice set.
Conclusion
When skills are only partly transferable across generations of technology, greater familiarity with an existing technology may make it easier to upgrade. However, greater skill at using the existing technology also leads to a higher opportunity cost of upgrading. A ¿rm that is less skilled has a lower opportunity cost and may upgrade, even though it cannot use the new technology as pro¿tably as a more skilled ¿rm that chooses not to upgrade. The less skilled ¿rm may continue to upgrade to increasingly sophisticated technologies, even though it never becomes expert at using any of them.
It eventually achieves higher pro¿ts than the more skilled ¿rm.
This kind of overtaking can occur even when ¿rms are forward looking, as in Parente's (1994) model. However, overtaking never occurs if ¿rms are suf¿ciently patient.
When the myopic ¿rm's upgrade decision depends non-trivially on its skill level, a forward looking ¿rm decides to upgrade for a larger set of skill levels. In this sense, forward looking ¿rms are more likely to upgrade, and they upgrade more frequently.
Low levels of economic development are often associated with inef¿cient ¿nancial markets and a high discount rate. The high cost of capital discourages adoption of a new technology, and thus impedes development. Somewhat paradoxically, a high discount rate may also make overtaking more likely. Thus, a situation where technologically backward ¿rms overtake their relatively advanced rivals is more likely to occur in markets where discount rates are high.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof. (Proposition 1.) The proof for part 1 of the proposition is standard de¿ne the
Since W is a contraction mapping with modulus qc the solution to (5) exists.
The second part follows from the result that if the solution to the sequence problem (SP) is bounded, the solution to the DPE satisfying
is the unique solution to the sequence problem (SP 
Therefore the solution to the sequence problem (SP) is bounded.
Proof. (Proposition 2.)
We use the fact that 8 E&( #c ? ' c 8 E&( #c f to "guess" the trial solution: h T E#c ? ' c T E# for some function T Given the uniqueness of h T E#c ?, this trial solution must be correct if it solves the DPE. Since the equation of motion of # is independent of ?, we can substitute the trial solution into equation (5) to obtain an equivalent DPE
Dividing both sides by c results in a DPE -and thus an optimal decision rule -which is independent of both ? and |.
Proof. (Lemma 1.)
The ¿rm with initial precision # : # never upgrades, so # | $ 4 and its pro¿ts converge to c f >, where ? f is the initial grade of technology.
The ¿rm with initial precision # # continues to upgrade in every period so ? | $ 4
and # | $ # r . Thus, its pro¿ts approach n4 provided that > ÅE5 r : f. Suppose to the contrary that > ÅE5 r f. In that case, E> (since E# r # r ), so it is not optimal to upgrade at # r , contradicting the assumptions of the lemma.
Proof. (Theorem 1.)
We show that for suf¿ciently small but positive values of qc it is optimal to upgrade in every period when # is small, and it is optimal never to upgrade when # is large. Using equation (10) and the de¿nition of 5E#, it is optimal not to upgrade if
T E# is nondecreasing and T E b : fc since the strategy of never upgrading in the future gives a stream of positive payoffs when # :
b . Thus, for # b , the right side of equation (11) . Given the assumed parameter restrictions, # W exists for q suf¿ciently small but positive. Thus, equation (11) is satis¿ed, and it is optimal not to upgrade for # # 4@ i# W c b j. It is optimal to upgrade if the inequality in equation (11) is reversed. The right side of equation (11) is approximately f for small q the left side is independent of q and is strictly negative for # in the neighborhood of # r (since # r # ). Therefore, 
Proof. (Proposition 3.) Suppose to the contrary that
We derive a contradiction for the two interesting cases. 7 Case 1: it is optimal to upgrade at # q " for small positive " and it is optimal to stick with the current technology 7 We ignore the unlikely possibility that the ¿rm prefers to upgrade (or prefers to stick) for both f , small. Even if this situation could arise, it is plausible that a perturbation of parameters would eliminate it.
for A periods at # q n ". (We allow the possibility that A ' 4, a necessary condition for overtaking.) Case 2: It is optimal to stick at # q " for small positive " and it is optimal to upgrade at # q n " (Case 2 corresponds to the second row of Table 1 .) Case 1. Choose # ' # q n ", so that the optimal policy yields the payoff
where A (possibly in¿nite) is the optimal time of the next upgrade. Consider the deviation of moving forward the time of the next upgrade, e.g. upgrading at time f rather than time A . The payoff corresponding to this deviation is (E#
Using these expressions, we have
Evaluate this difference at # ' # q , where E#c f ' 5E# f by equation (12) . By lemma 2, E#c |D : f for | : f, so the term in the square brackets is positive. By lemma 3 and monotonicity of T , the term in the curly brackets is positive. Therefore (E# q T E# q : f, which contradicts optimality.
Case 2. Choose # # q with # n D : # q . The optimal policy at such a value of # is to wait until the next period to upgrade, which leads to the payoff
Consider the deviation of upgrading in the current period rather than in the next one.
We again denote the value of this deviation as (E# G (E# ' > E# n q > E# n D n q 2 T E E# n 2D
The difference in the payoff is (E# T E# ' 5E# n q E# n D E# n D nq 2 iT E E# n 2D T E E# n D n Dj from Corollary 1, we obtain { q i# G # : # q j { f If # q does not exist, it is optimal to upgrade for all #, so { q ' ? n (iii) In this case, { f ' i# G # # j. If # q exists, then from Corollary 1, # q : # . We need to show that { q i# G # # q j (This relationship implies that for q : f it is strictly better to upgrade at # ' # ) Suppose, to the contrary, that for # # q it is optimal not to upgrade. Then at # ' # it is optimal to stick with the current technology for A periods, where A is the smallest integer that satis¿es # ' # n A D # q . At time A time it is optimal to upgrade. Consider the deviation of upgrading in the current period (when # ' # ) rather than waiting A periods. The additional pro¿ts resulting from this deviation, rather than following the optimal program, are
The ¿rst term (square brackets) is positive using the de¿nition of # and lemma 2, and the second term (curly brackets) is positive by lemma 3 and monotonicity of T E#.
Consequently, it must be optimal to upgrade when # ' # and q : f. Therefore
If # q does not exist, it is optimal to upgrade for all #, so { q ' ? and # : # so that the conditions for the proposition hold. Since these conditions imply the parameter restrictions in the lower left corner of Table 1 , the optimal technology choice in the restricted model is to set & ' (using Theorem 3). If the ¿rm were to set & ' 4 in the unrestricted model, then (from equation (8)) the variance becomes unbounded, so all future payoffs are negative. Thus, the present discounted value of future payoffs is negative. From equation (9) the current payoff is in¿nitely negative. Thus, the payoff when & ' 4 is in¿nitely negative, so & ' 4 is not optimal. 
